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AN END TO UNILATERAL U.S. ACTION IN 
LATIN AMERICA: A CALL FOR EXPANDING 
THE ROLE OF THE O.A.S. 
The day our plenipotentiaries make the exchanges of their power 
will stamp in the diplomatic history of the world an immortal ep-
och. When after a hundred centuries, posterity shall search for the 
origin of our public law, and shall remember the compacts that so-
lidified its density, they will finger with respect the protocols of the 
Isthmus. In them they will find the plan of the first alliances that 
shall sketch the mark of our relations with the universe. What, 
then, shall be the Isthmus of Corinth compared with that of 
Panama? 
Simon Bolivar, 1824. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the United States and the other na-
tions of the Western Hemisphere has sometimes been character-
ized as one of hemispheric solidarity and cooperation.1 Unfortu-
nately, this relationship has too often been marred by the United 
States' paternalistic attitude towards its southern neighbors,2 and 
by its numerous unilateral acts of military intervention in the af-
fairs of these nations. 3 Although it has been argued that the in-
terventionist policies of the United States may have been justified 
at one point in history;' justification for such interventionist poli-
cies can find no legitimate support in modern international law.1 
1. This is due not only to the geographic proximity of the nations of the Western Hemi-
sphere, but also to the fact that these nations were all at one time part of various European 
colonial empires and share a common heritage of revolutionary struggle for independence. 
See, e.g., C. FENWICK, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 3 (1963); INTER-AMERICAN 
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM XV (1966). 
2. As result of the American victory in the Spanish American War and the United 
States' subsequent rise to the status of a world power, it was felt by influential U.S. leaders 
that Latin America was properly within the United States "sphere of influence." See Boyle, 
American Foreign Policy Toward International Law and Organizations: 1898-1917, 6 Lov. 
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 185, 274 (1983); Wells, Institutional Framework of Inter-American 
Relations, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 223, 228 (1983). 
3. For a brief synopsis of the numerous acts of intervention by the United States be-
tween 1898-1967, see Wells, supra note 2, at 229-33. 
4. In the past, U.S. intervention in Latin America has largely been justified on the pre-
text of preventing aggression or intervention by extra-continental powers. See id. at 229. 
The U.S. has in a large part been successful in this respect. See, e.g., Thomas & Thomas, 
Jr., The Organization of American States and the Monroe Doctrine-Legal Implications, 30 
LA. L. REV. 541 (1970); Boyle, supra note 2, at 272. 
5. For example, Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter provides that "all 
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Nevertheless, due to the threat of general warfare in Central 
America, fears of "Revolution Without Borders," and perceived 
threats to national security interests, the United States may feel 
that it has no alternative but to continue its already expanding 
involvement in this region. 6 
This Note advocates the establishment of a multi-national po-
lice force, organized under the auspices of the Organization of 
American States. Such a force should preclude the perceived need 
for unilateral U.S. action, and could be utilized without violating 
international laws prohibiting intervention. 7 
Part II of this Note will discuss U.S.- Latin American relations 
from a historical prespective. Part III of this Note will discuss the 
present situation and illustrate the need for some type of affirma-
tive action by the members of the O.A.S. Part IV of this Note will 
discuss a proposal for the establishment of a multi-national force 
under the O.A.S., and Part V will conclude that the establishment 
of such a force would promote the stated goals of the Inter-Ameri-
can system; and that in the absence of such force it is likely that 
the United States will continue to follow a policy of unilateral ac-
tion in this area. 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. HISTORICAL U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA 
Historically, the United States has viewed . its relations with 
Latin America from the context of the Monroe Doctrine. 8 This 
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity and political interdependence" of another State. U.N. CHARTER art. 
2, para. 4. Similarly, Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States 
(0.A.S.) provides "no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indi-
rectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state." The 
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or 
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and 
cultural elements. Charter of the Organization of American States, reprinted in C. FENWICK, 
supra note 1, at 547-71 (0.A.S. Charter); see also Schwenninger, The 1980's: New Doctrines 
of Intervention of New Norms of Non-intervention?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 423 (1980). But 
see Note, Grenada and The International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1981), 
for a defense of recent U.S. intervention in the Carribean. 
6. Current U.S. policies seem to reflect a preference for strengthening U.S. capacity for 
unilateral action in response to threatening situations. Note, Peacekeeping and Human 
Rights: A Proposed 0 .A.S . Response to Civil Strife in Latin America, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 293, 
341 (1982). 
7. See supra note 5. 
8. Monroe Doctrine, reprinted in G. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 
(1906). Although some of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine have found their way into 
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doctrine was proclaimed in an address to Congress by President 
James Monroe in 1823.9 The doctrine's intent was to prevent the 
further expansion or acquisition of colonial holdings in the West-
ern Hemisphere by European powers.10 It is based on the underly-
ing principles of non-colonization11 and non-intervention.12 The 
non-colonization principle, 18 although broadly asserted to include 
the entire Western Hemisphere, was actually a direct response to 
the immediate threat of Tsarist Russia's purported claims to hold-
ings in the Oregon territory. 1• 
The portion of the doctrine addressing with non-intervention 
provided that while the United States would not interfere with any 
European colonies which already existed in the Western Hemi-
sphere, 1G it would certainly look unkindly on any future European 
intervention with those American states which had recently gained 
their independence. 16 
During the presidency of James Polk, the Monroe Doctrine 
was further expanded to include a prohibition against the acquisi-
international law, see infra note 44, the Doctrine itself is neither codified international law, 
treaty or contract, but is rather a presidential proclamation of the international political 
policy of the United States. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 271; Thomas and Thomas, Jr., supra 
note 4. For a discussion of the efficacy of the Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's, see Note, The 
Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's: Inter-national Law, Unilateral Policy, or Atavistic Anach-
ronism? 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 203 (1982). For backround and history on the Monroe 
Doctrine, see D. PERKINS, HANDS OFF: A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1941); F. DONO-
VAN, MR. MONROE'S MESSAGE (1963); THE MONROE DOCTRINE, ITS MODERN SIGNIFICANCE (D. 
Duzer ed. 1965). 
9. See Annual Message to Congress, American State Papers, 5 FOREIGN REL. 250 (Dec. 
2, 1923). 
10. See generally Note, supra note 9. 
11. The non-colonization principle asserts that the· Western Hemisphere will be hence-
forth off limits for colonial expansion by European powers. See Thomas & Thomas, Jr., 
supra note 4, at 542; see also Note, supra note 9, at 204. 
12. The principle of non-intervention was originally based on two underlying proposi-
tions: a statement declaring a policy of non-intervention in European affairs by the United 
States; and a warning against European intervention in the Americas. See Note, supra note 
9 at 205; Thomas & Thomas, Jr. supra note 4, at 542. Obviously, the United States has long 
ago abandoned any semblance of adherance to the first of these two propositions originally 
espoused by President Monroe. Nevertheless, contentions that the remaining principles of 
the doctrine are therefore no longer valid have had little effect, and have been answered 
with the argument that the Monroe Doctrine was always a unilateral pronouncement of the 
United States and not a contract or treaty based on certain conditions. See Thomas & 
Thomas, Jr. supra note 4, at 542. 
13. This principle was stated in a declaration that "the American continents. . .are 
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." 
See G. MOORE, supra note 9, at 401. 
14. See Note, supra note 9, at 204. 
15. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 271. 
16. Id. 
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tion of territory located in the Western Hemisphere by cession 
from one European power to another .17 Although the Monroe Doc-
trine was clearly the unilateral policy of the United States,18 its 
application during the latter part of the 19th century was generally 
appreciated by the weak, newly independent republics of Latin 
America.19 
However, with a U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War 
and the United States' subsequent rise to the status of a world 
power, the Monroe Doctrine took on new dimensions. 20 In his mes-
sage to Congress on December 6, 1904,21 President Theodore 
Roosevelt announced yet another corollary to the Monroe Doc-
trine. 22 Under this policy, the United States assigned to itself the 
role of "international police-man".28 This policy, which was relied 
on successively by the Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson administra-
tions,24 was used as justification for numerous acts of interven-
tion,H including the machinations which led to the U.S. acquisition 
17. This was known as the Polk Corollary and was in response to the feared cession of 
Spanish Florida to Great Britian. These fears were put to rest with the U.S. purchase of 
Spanish Florida. See E. McCORMACK, JAMES K. POLK: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1965); Boyle, 
supra note 2, at 271. 
18. See supra notes 9 and 13. 
19. Even though most applications of the Monroe Doctrine were motivated by U.S. in-
terests, it was well understood by the newly independent Latin American States that the 
Doctrine was in large part responsible for their ability to achieve and maintain indepen-
dence from their European mother countries. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 272; see also Note, 
supra note 9, at 208. 
20. See supra note 2. 
21. See J. RICHARDSON, 9 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 7024, 7053 (1911). 
22. This became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and pro-
vided for U.S. intervention to enforce payment of debts owed to European nations, obsten-
sibly to prevent these creditor nations from taking direct action themselves in contravention 
of the Monroe Doctrine. For a full discussion of the Roosevelt Corollary, See D. MONROE, 
INTERVENTION AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN THE CARIBBEAN 1900-1921, at 65-111 (1964). 
23. Id; see also Wells, supra note 2, at 229; Boyle, supra note 2, at 273. 
24. See Wells, supra note 2, at 229. 
25. During this period (1904-1933), the United States set up or attempted to set up 
economic receiverships in several Latin American countries. Many of these receiverships 
were accomplished through the use of U.S. armed forces. Additionally, U.S. forces were used 
to suppress rebellions against governments which the United States supported. Further, 
under the Wilson Administration, the United States began a policy of non-recognition of 
new governments which came to power by force. Id. at 228-30. Acts of U.S. intervention 
during the next several decades included the following: 
1905 - United States took over the collection of customs duties in the Dominican 
Republic and began to disburse the proceeds to the Dominican Government and its 
creditors. 
1911 - Customs receivership system extended to Nicaragua. 
1915 - Customs receivership system extended to Haiti. 
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of the Panama Canal Zone. 26 
Although strenuous objections to these policies were . raised by 
leading Latin American statesmen, 27 blatant U.S. intervention into 
Latin American affairs continued up until 1933.28 The ramifica-
tions of this interventionist policy has chronically plagued and 
hopelessly perplexed U.S. Foreign Policy in this region up to and 
including the present day. 29 
B. THE FORMATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
The Inter-American system had its genesis in the political the-
ories of the Great Liberator, Simon Bolivar. so In 1824, Bolivar pro-
posed the formation of a congress comprised of pleni-pontentiaries 
Id. 
1910 - U.S. forces landed in Nicaragua. 
1912 - U.S. forces again used in Nicaragua to suppress rebellion. (This occupation 
lasted from 1912 till 1933 with the exception of an 11 month period in 1925-26.) 
1913 - U.S. forces landed in Mexico. 
1914 - U.S. forces landed in Mexico. 
1916 - U.S. forces landed in Mexico. 
1916 - U.S. occupation of Haiti begins and lasts until 1934. 
1916 - U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic begins and lasts until 1924, at 
which time the United States establishes a protectorate over that nation lasting 
until 1941. 
In addition to these acts of intervention, between 1909 and 1912, the Taft Administra-
tion unsuccessfully attempted to extend the customs receivership system to Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras. Id. 
Further, under Theodore Roosevelt, the United States established a protectorate over 
Cuba lasting from 1903-1934, and a protectorate over Panama which lasted from 1903-1936. 
In the latter case, the United States first fomented and supported a rebellion by the prov-
ince of Panama against the soverign state of Columbia, and then entered into a treaty with 
the newly formed state which established a canal zone where the United States was author-
ized to act in perpetuity. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. For example, Luis Drago, the minister of Foreign Affairs in Argentina at the time of 
the promulgation of the Roosevelt Corallary to the Monroe Doctrine, took the position that 
neither force nor the occupation of territory was justified for the collection of public debts 
owed to foreign nationals. This was also the position taken by Chilean political writer Ale-
sandro Alvarez and, suprisingly enough, by Richard Olney, who was Secretary of State 
under Grover Cleveland, and Elihu Root, who was Secretary of State under Theodore 
Roosevelt. See A. ALVAREZ, THE MONROE DOCTRINE: ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LIFE OF THE STATES OF THE NEW WORLD (1924); Olney, The Development of International 
Law, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 427, 433-37 (1914). 
28. See supra note 26. 
29. Due to the fact that these acts of intervention by the United States were seen as "a 
unilateral policy of hegeomonical imperialism" in contravention to its stated ideals of non-
intervention and self-determination, it is not surprising that attitudes of distrust towards 
U.S. intentions remain until this day. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 270; see generally Wells, 
supra note 2. 
30. See H. ANGELL, SIMON BOLIVAR SOUTH AMERICAN LIBERATOR (1930). 
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from each state "that should act as a council in great conflicts, to 
be appealed to in case of common danger, and be a faithful inter-
preter of public treaties, when difficulties should arise, and concili-
ate, in short, all our differences. "81 
However, due to nationalistic rivalries between the Latin 
States, as well as personal animosities between several of the na-
tional leaders, the Congress failed to have any lasting effect.82 Nev-
ertheless, the congress of Panama, in spite of its shortcomings, had 
sown the seeds of the Inter-American system.88 
The Inter-American system, as it is today, began to take shape 
in 1889.84 At the invitation of the U.S. Government, representa-
tives of all but one of the then-existing 18 Latin American nations 
assembled in Washington, D.C., to inaugerate the First Interna-
tional Conference of American States. H The most significant ac-
complishment of the conference was the establishment of two in-
stitutions: The International Union of American Republics, and 
the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics. 88 Although 
these institutions have undergone significant changes in name, 
structure and function since 1890, both remain in existence up to 
the present day. 87 
Over the course of the next several decades, the nations of the 
Western Hemisphere were to meet several more times, thus estab-
lishing the institutional framework for the creation of the modern 
Inter-American system. 88 
31. This proposal was contained in a letter to the governments of Columbia, Mexico, 
The United Provinces of Central America, The United Provinces of Buenos Aires, Chile, 
and Brazil. The United States, however, was not invited out of fear of offending Great Brit-
ain, which had indicated it would oppose any confederation of which the United States was 
a member. The United States did subsequently receive an invitation to the congress from 
the Vice President of Columbia, which was warmly accepted by then Secretary of State 
Henry Clay. C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 14-16. The full text of Bolivar's letter is repro-
duced in INT'L CONFERENCES 1889-1928. 
32. See generally, C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 17-18. 
33. See generally id. 
34. Wells, supra note 2, at 223. 
35. The Latin American nations represented at the First International Conference of 
American States were the following: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. 
36. The purpose of the International Union of American Republics was to ensure "[t]he 
prompt collection and distribution of commercial information." The purpose of the Com-
mercial Bureau of the American Republics was to serve as the International Union's agency 
for collecting and disseminating international trade information under the supervision of 
the United States Secretary of State. Id. at 224; see also C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 36. 
37. Wells, supra note 2, at 24. 
38. The First International American Conference was followed by a second conference 
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Though great strides towards increased hemispheric unity 
were made during this period,89 a major concern for most of the 
Latin American states was ending the continuing interventionism 
of the United States.''° This goal was finally reached with the an-
nouncement of President Franklin Roosevelt's good neighbor pol-
icy,41 and the subsequent U.S. adoption of the principles of non-
intervention contained in the Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States.42 
The adoption of these new policies by the United States was 
followed in short order by the Inter-American Conference for the 
Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace, held in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1936.48 At this convention, the princi-
ples of consultation and mutual respect were adopted by the na-
tions of the Western Hemisphere. 44 This in turn was followed by 
which met in Mexico City in 1901; a third conference which met in Rio de Janeiro in 1906; 
and a fourth conference which met in Buenos Aires in 1910. A fifth conference scheduled for 
1914 was postponed due to World War I, but did eventually convene in Santiago in 1923. A 
sixth conference met in Havana in 1928. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 292. For an in depth 
discussion of the substantive content of these conferences, see C. FENWICK, supra note l, at 
33-59. 
39. See generally C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 33-59. 
40. In light of the many acts of intervention in Latin America committed by the United 
States up to and through out this period of time, it is not surprising that "the principle of 
non-intervention became the cardinal doctrine of all Latin Americans in their dealings with 
the U.S., and indeed with one another." In the eyes of Latin America, nonintervention is the 
cornerstone of the Inter-American system. See Wells, supra note 2, at 227, 230; see also C. 
FENWICK, supra note 1, at 54. 
41. Roosevelt announced this policy in his inaugural address of March 4, 1933. See C. 
FENWICK, supra note l, at 56. 
42. At the 7th International Conference of American States, held in Montevideo in De-
cember, 1933, the United States joined with the nations of Latin America in approving the 
convention. Article 8 of the convention provides that "[n]o state has the right to intervene 
in the internal or external affairs of another." See Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States, reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 57. 
43. This conference was initiated by President Franklin Roosevelt, who recognized an 
opportunity to promote his goals of hemispheric cooperation in the climate engendered by 
the peace protocols which had recently been negotiated at Buenos Aires between Bolivia 
and Paraguay. At this conference, the nations of the Western Hemisphere agreed to engage 
in collective consultation in the event of a threat to the peace. 
It. was also agreed that a common front should be taken against any threatened aggres-
sion from Europe. This of course implied an obligation on the part of the United States not 
to take action under the Monroe Doctrine without first consulting with the other nations. 
The adoption of a "common front" towards extra-continental aggression was a major step 
towards the "continentalization" of the Monroe Doctrine and the principles of collective 
security." See infra note 46. It was also felt that the principles of the equality of nations was 
greatly advanced by this conference. See C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 59-62. For a detailed 
and contemporaneous discussion of the conference, see Fenwick, The Inter-American Con-
ference for The Maintenance of Peace, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 201 (1937). 
44. See generally C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 59-62. 
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the "continentalization" of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine 
by the Eighth International Conference of American States held at 
Lima in 1938."1 
A commitment to collective action was evidenced by the sub-
sequent adoption of the Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and 
Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas, at Ha-
vana in 1940."6 This commitment was soon to be tested with the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941."7 With the 
notable exception of Argentina and Chile, all of the signatory 
states met their obligations under the treaty by severing all rela-
tions with the Axis powers. "8 
With the end of World War II, the principles of Collective Se-
curity were reinforced and expanded with the adoption of the Act 
of Chapultepec, at Mexico City in 1945."9 This act set important 
precedents, both by providing for the collective use of armed force 
to combat aggression, and by providing for the application of sanc-
tions to aggressors, even if they be American. 10 It was additionally 
agreed that the Inter-American system should be strengthened and 
reorganized into a regional arrangement, consistent with the prin-
ciples and procedures of a general international organization to be 
established in the future. H 
45. With the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the nations of the Western Hemi-
sphere saw the need to strengthen the regional bonds of the American States and to prepare 
to take measures of common defense. Through the conference at Lima, the American States: 
(1) reaffirmed the principles of continental solidarity; (2) reaffirmed their commitment to 
maintain these principles and to defend them "against all foreign intervention and activity;" 
(3) proclaimed in the event of a threat to the peace, security or territorial integrity of any 
American republic their common concern and their determination to act in concert; and (4) 
agreed that the procedure of a consultation would consist of meetings of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs in their several capitals by rotation and without protoctilary character. This 
multilateral endorsement of the principles of collective security against extra-continental 
intervention was referred to as the "continentalization" of the Monroe Doctrine. See C. FEN-
WICK, supra note 1, at 63. For a more detailed discussion of the conference at Lima, see 
Fenwick, The Monroe Doctrine and the Declaration of Lima, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1939). 
46. The declaration provided that, "[a]ny attempt on the part of a non-American State 
against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty, or the political inde-
pendence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against the States 
which sign this declaration." Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the 
Americas, reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES 360-61 (J.B. 
Scott ed., Supp. 1933-1940). 
47. Note, supra note 9, at 211. 
48. Id. 
49. See Act of Chapultepec, Mar. 8, 1945, Res. VIII, 60 Stat.1837, T.l.A.S. No. 1543. 
This act provided for collective sanctions, including the use of armed force, to be taken 
against any aggressor of an American State - even an American aggressor. 
50. See id. 
51. Here, the nations of the Americas were considering which definitive form would be 
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To advance this goal, a draft charter was prepared for present-
ment to the Ninth International Conference of American States. 62 
This proposed charter would later become the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty).63 The Rio Treaty 
was the first collective security treaty to be drafted in accordance 
with the inherent right of collective self-defense, as recognized by 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.64 It was also the first regional secur-
ity treaty to be formulated since Article 52 of the U .N. Charter 
came into effect, permitting "the existence of regional arrange-
ments or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate 
for regional action. "66 
Soon after the ratification of the Rio Treaty, the goal of reor-
ganizing and institutionalizing the Inter-American system was real-
ized with the adoption of the Charter of the Organization of Amer-
ican States66 (0.A.S.), at the Ninth International Conference of 
given to the Union of American Republics after the war. A resolution on establishment of a 
general international organization was adopted, proclaiming the determination of the Amer-
ican Republics to cooperate in an organization based upon law, justice and equity. C. FEN-
WICK, supra note l, at 71. 
52. See Wells, supra note 2, at 234. 
53. See Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 6, 62 Stat. 
1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Treaty]. Although the United 
States was at the time more in favor of universalism under the United Nations, the advent 
of the cold war considerably increased the attractiveness of a regional organization. See gen-
erally Wells, supra note 2. The treaty called for the immediate meeting of the Organ of 
Consultation, later defined as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of agreeing 
with a collective courses of action to be taken in the event of aggression. Rio Treaty, supra, 
art. 6. Additionally, the treaty obligated the signatory states to provide for a collective de-
fense. Id. art. 3. 
Further, the Rio Treaty expanded the definition of aggression to include acts which 
were not armed attacks.This treaty was entered into by the United States and all of the 
Latin American States except Ecuador and Nicaragua. See Wells, supra note 2, at 235-36; C. 
FENWICK, supra note 1, at 75-80. 
54. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see also Wells, supra note 2, at 235. 
55. U.N. CHARTER art 52. 
56. O.A.S. Charter, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 
amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 721 
U.N.T.S. 324, reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 547-71. 
The O.A.S. is structured around eight principle organs with the General Assembly as 
the supreme organ. The General Assembly meets annually for conferences of the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of the various Member States. The General Secretariat is the central and 
permanent organ to carry out the instructions of the General Assembly as well as the other 
councils and organs. Scheman, The 0 .A.S. and the Quest for International Cooperation: 
American Vision or Mirage, 13 CASE W. RES. J . INT'L L. 83, 86 (1983). 
Three separate and equal subordinate councils govern specialized matters of mutual 
interests: the Permanent Council for Political Affairs, which is in continual year-round ses-
sion, and two councils for sectoral cooperation, which meet annually, the Inter-American 
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American States held in Bogata, in 1948.G7 
The purpose of the O.A.S. is to provide an organization within 
the framework of the United Nations which can be used to ad-
vance economic cooperation, human development, and collective 
security among the member nations. 58 Although the goal of the 
O.A.S. is to promote the pacific settlement of disputes59 and to 
abide by the tenets of non-intervention,60 the charter provides for 
the use of force to combat any aggression against a member state.61 
Since the institutionalization of the O.A.S. it has been called 
upon on numerous occasions to resolve regional disputes. 62 Some 
Economic and Social Council (CIES) and the Inter-American Council for Education, Sci-
ence, and Culture (CIECC). An Inter-American Juridical Committee conducts studies on 
codification of international law to attain uniformity of legislation. The other organ is the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, recently supplemented by an Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights, with the establishment of the Inter-American Convention of 
Human Rights on July 18, 1978. The system also provides a formal mechanism for the Gen-
eral Assembly to establish specialized organizations for specific technical ends, and special-
ized conferences for specific subjects requiring Inter-American cooperation. Id. 
The principle mechanism for the enforcement of peaceful settlement is the Meeting of 
Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which can be convened by any Member 
State or, in the event of an armed attack, by the Chairman of the Permanent Council of the 
Organization. The Permanent Council has been given broad powers to assist in the peaceful 
settlement of disputes which any party may bring to it. A special Inter-American Committee 
on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes is provided for by Articles 83-90 of the O.A.S Charter, 
to assist the council in the exercise of these functions, provided that both parties to the 
dispute agree. Id. 
57. See C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 81. 
58. O.A.S. Charter, arts. 1-19, reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 1, 548-51. Original 
signatores of the charter are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicara-
gua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, Venezeula. See id. at 571. 
The organization now includes 29 nations: the United States, 19 Latin American coun-
tries, 8 caribbean states (all former British colonies, including Antigua/Barbuda, admitted 
in 1981), and Suriname (formerly Dutch Guiana). Not included are Canada, which has al-
ways held itself rather self-consciously apart; Cuba, which was expelled in 1962; Guyana, 
part of whose territory is claimed by Venezuela; and Belize, all of whose territory is claimed 
by Guatemala. See Wells, supra note 2, at 224 (citing M. BALL, THE O.A.S. IN TRANSITION 69-
72 (1969)). 
59. See O.A.S. Charter, reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 548-71. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. For example, some specific disputes in which the O.A.S. has helped diffuse the situ-
ation are: 
1. Costa Rica-Nicaragua, 1948 - helped restore peace. 
2. Haiti - Dominican Republic, 1949 - helped restore peace. 
3. Guatemala, 1954 - action too late. 
4. Costa Rica - Nicaragua, 1955 - helped restore peace. 
5. Equador-Peru, 1955 - helped restore peace. 
6. Honduras-Nicaragua, 1957 - helped restore peace. 
7. Costa Rica-Nicaragua, 1959 - conflict died down. 
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commentators have observed that in this respect, the O.A.S. has 
achieved a far more impressive track record than the United 
Nations.63 
III. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
At the present time, a consensus exists among the majority of 
member-states that there is a need to reinvigorate and strengthen 
the 0.A.S .. 6" This consensus exists against a backdrop of continu-
ing strife in the Central American Region.61 
The theory has been advanced that this region has now ob-
tained the undesirable status of being "[a] zone of hegemonic con-
frontation" between East and West. 66 This theory is borne out by 
the continued efforts of the United States to destabilize the Marx-
ist Government of Nicaragua,67 as well as by the existence of a 
8. Panama-Cuba, 1959 - helped restore calm. 
9. Dominican Sanctions, 1960 - increased pressure for over-throw of Trujillo 
Regime. 
10. Bolivia-Chile, 1962 - helped calm parties. 
11. Cuban Missle Crisis, 1962 - support for United States 
12. Haiti-Dominican Republic, 1963 - helped restore calm. 
13. Panama Canal Riots, 1964 - helped provide forum for discussion. 
14. Dominican Republic, 1965 sanctions Inter-American peace 
keeping efforts. 
15. El Salvador-Honduras, 1969 - established truce in 48 hours. 
16. Belize, 1972 - refuted charges of British military presence. 
17. Costa Rica-Nicaragua, 1978 - led to replacement of Somoza regime. 
Scheman, supra note 57, at 90 (citing J. Dominguez, Ghosts From the Past: War Territorial 
and Boundary Disputes in Mainland Central and South America since 1960 (May 18, 1977) 
(presented for discussion at O.A.S. seminar)). 
63. See Scheman, supra note 57, at 90. 
64. See Zanotti, Regional and International Activities, 17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
131, 132-133 (1985). 
65. For example, at the present time there are guerilla forces operating against the gov-
ernments of both Nicaragua and El Salvador. Additionally, the situation is tense in Costa 
Rica, Honduras and other neighboring countries. See generally Lobel & Ratner, Is United 
States Military Intervention in Central America Illegal?, 12 HuM. RTs. 23 (1984); Fried-
lander, Confusing Victims and Victimizers: Nicaragua and the Reinterpretation of Inter-
National Law, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. 87 (1985). 
66. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1981, at 6, col. 1. This theory was advanced by President 
Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico, who felt that "U.S. Military Aid and the inordinate amount 
of attention" being paid to tiny El Salvador had elevated the region "to the undersirable 
catagory of a strategic frontier." Id. 
67. For discussion of U.S. support for the Nicaraguan Rebels, see, e.g., Beres, Ignoring 
International Law: U.S. Policy on Insurgency and Intervention in Central America, 14 
DEN. J. INT'L L. 76 (1985); Friedlander, supra note 66; Lobel & Ratner, supra note 66, at 39-
40; Malloy, Developments at the International Court of Justice: Provisional Measures and 
Jurisdiction in the Nicaragua Case, 6 N.Y.L. ScH. J . INT'L & CoMP. L. 55, 58 (1984); Note, 
The Legitimacy of U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua, 6 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135 
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large body of evidence tending to implicate Nicaragua, Cuba, and 
ultimately the Soviet Union in the continuing guerilla war being 
waged against the government of El Salvador. 68 This theory is fur-
ther supported by the events which occurred in Grenada during 
October, 1983.69 
Although plausible justifications have been advanced to sup-
port the actions of the various participants of these disputes,70 the 
fact remains that many of these activities are in violation of inter-
national law.71 Additionally, the actions taken by the United 
States, whether justified or not, raise the spectre of a return to a 
policy of unilateral U.S. decision making in this region. 72 
(1984). 
68. See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 66, at 92-94; Note, supra note 68, at 144-145. 
69. Grenada is a small island nation in the Caribbean belonging to the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which is a sub-regional organization within the O.A.S. In 
March 1979, the constitutional government was overthrown in a coup led by Maucice 
Bishop. Over the next several years, the marxist Bishop regime developed strong ties with 
Cuba and the Soviet Union. Additionally, relationships with such other Soviet client states 
as North Korea, East Germany and Libya were cultivated. On October 13, 1983, Bishop was 
placed under arrest by the New Jewel party which was seeking a more hard line Leniniza-
tion of Grenadian society. This was followed by widespread civil disorder and upheaval as 
the various factions fought for control. On October 25, 1983, ostensibly to guarantee the 
safety of some 1,000 U.S. citizens on the island, the U.S. led an O.E.C.S. "peacekeeping" 
mission to restore order. For an in depth discussion of the events leading up to the U.S. 
invasion of Grenada, which is generally supportive of the role taken by the United States, 
see Note, Grenada and the Inter-National Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984). 
70. For example, the United States claims that it is acting in the name of collective 
security to prevent the subversion of Latin America governments by extra-continental com-
munist forces. Additionally, the United States points to the fact that its assistance was re-
quested by various Central American regimes. Nicaragua, in contrast, bases its actions on 
the rights of revolution, self-determination and social change. See generally Note, supra 
note 68, at 138-155. 
71. Both the U.S. arming of Nicaraguan rebels, and the Nicaraguan arming of El Salva-
dorian, Honduran and Guatemalan rebels for the purpose of destabilizing the respective 
governments of these nations violates articles 15-19 of the O.A.S. Charter, which prohibit 
intervention, either direct or indirect, as well as economic, military, or political coercion 
against the government of another American state. See O.A.S. Charter, reprinted in C. FEN-
WICK, supra note 1, at 550-51. 
Additionally, both U.S. and Nicaraguan actions ignore treaty imperatives with regard to 
non-intervention and the settlement of disputes. Note, supra note 68, at 155. Unfortunately, 
before the conflicting claims of Nicaragua and the United States could be fully litigated in 
the International Court of Justice, the United States refused to further submit to the courts 
jurisdiction. See Malloy, supra note 68, at 57 (citing U.S. Withdrawal form the Proceedings 
initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, reprinted in 24 l.L.M. 246 
(1985). 
72. Present U.S. policy in Central America represents in part, a return to the Monroe 
Doctrine. "There also appears to be emerging, though rather tentatively, a 'Reagan Corol-
lary' to the Monroe Doctrine." Friedlander, supra note 66, at 92; see also Note, supra note 
6; Note, supra note 68, at 158-160. 
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However, international law as a whole lacks a means of en-
forcement,78 and an adequate peace keeping mechanism still eludes 
the O.A.S .. 7" Therefore, in the absence of any legitimate regional 
force, it is likely that the United States will feel compelled to con-
tinue with its unilateral actions in this area. 7~ 
IV. PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTI 
NATIONAL POLICE FORCE UNDER THE O.A.S. 
"Many commentators and concerned world citizens question 
the efficacy of international law when effective enforcement ap-
pears to be an unascertainable goal".76 It is felt that the O.A.S. 
should promote positive action on peace keeping, and there is pres-
sure on leaders to find alternatives to the methods being used. 77 
One such alternative would be the establishment of a perma-
nent, multinational "police force," organized under the auspicies of 
the O.A.S .. 78 Such a force might be organized under the Inter-
73. It can be argued that international law as a whole has no de facto method of en-
forcement, and adherance to its tenets by national actors is mainly a matter of good faith. 
See Friedlander, supra note 66, at 88. 
7 4. See Scheman, supra note 57, at 89. 
75. It has been pointed out that "in the absence of a legitimate regional military force, 
the United States occasionally has acted unilaterally to protect perceived interests, espe-
cially in response to developments that are interpreted as strengthening Communist influ-
ence in the hemisphere." Note, supra note 6, at 306. In view of the disposition of the pre-
sent administration, it seems likely that in the absence of any such legitimate force, the U.S. 
might again take unilateral action. See id. 
76. Note, supra note 68, at 158. It has been pointed out that twice in the 20th century 
international security organizations have been founded for the express purpose of preserving 
a minimum standard of world order. The League of Nations made a weak attempt and 
inevitably, failed. Unfortunately, the United Nations in this respect seems to be following 
the same path. See Friedlander, supra note 66, at 89. 
77. As development progresses, pressures on national leaders increase, requiring the 
continuing availability of recognized legal alternatives for maintaining the peace. Scheman, 
supra note 57, at 91. This hemisphere requires a mechanism to promote positive actions in 
the realm of social and economic progress as well as peace-keeping and international law. Id. 
at 102. 
78. The idea of an international police force is hardly novel. For example, the idea of an 
international police force was widely advocated in the American international legal commu-
nity during the period of World War I. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 205. Fears of U.S. domi-
nation of such a force have in the past caused the Latin American members of the O.A.S. to 
be wary of the role of regional peace keeping. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the exis-
tence of such a force might deter arbitrary U.S. action. See generally Scheman, supra note 
57, at 92. For an in depth discussion of the establishment of such a force for the purpose of 
protecting human rights, see Note, supra note 6. The force advocated there is, however, far 
more interventionery in nature than the force here proposed. For a proposal calling for the 
establishment of a general permanent force under the United Nations, see Schwenninger, 
supra note 5, at 432. 
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American Defense Board, which is the O.A.S. organ charged with 
military preparation. 79 
Alternatively, this force could be organized as a specialized 
agency pursuant to Article 53 of the O.A.S. Charter which pro-
vides, in relevant part, for the drafting and submission of propos-
als for the creation of new, specialized agencies. 80 Either way would 
be feasible, as the O.A.S. Charter is constructed so as to easily ac-
comodate new agencies or organs. 81 This force could be funded and 
supplied in accordance with the "ability to pay" quota system 
which the O.A.S. already employs to fund its present operations.82 
The man power for the proposed force, should however, be equally 
drawn from the armed forces of the member states. 83 
This force would have to be arranged so as to be independent 
of national influences as much as possible, and subject solely to the 
control of the O.A.S.. Therefore, while troops would be on duty 
with the O.A.S., they could not be affiliated with the military of 
their respective nations. 84 
79. The Inter-American Defense Board was established in 1942, and in its regulations 
describes itself as "a military international agency, subordinate to the governments of the 
American states, for consultation and preparation in matters of collective defense." The 
board is organized under the Advisory Defense Committee, in accordance with Articles 44-
47 of the O.A.S. Charter. See C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 112; see also O.A.S. Charter, 
reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 555-56. 
80. See O.A.S. Charter, art. 53, reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 557. 
81. See generally id. 
82. This system was adopted in 1960 due to the great disparity in wealth between the 
various member states. At the present time the United States underwrites approximately 66 
percent of the cost of the 0.A.S., whereas Grenada and other miniscule new member states 
contribute only 0.03 percent each. See Wells, supra note 2, at 225. 
This system is authorized by Article 54 of the O.A.S. Charter. See O.A.S. Charter, art. 
54, reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 557. 
83. Although there is a quota system for financial matters, see supra note 83, there is 
no necessity for such a quota system when it comes to manpower. Equal manning of this 
force would promote the ideal of national equality. But see Note, supra note 6, at 323, 
proposing that the actual membership of any such force be drawn almost exclusively from 
Latin American countries to avoid triggering anti-U.S. resentment. It is there posited that 
minimizing the profile of U.S. troops or advisors might enhance the perception of neutrality. 
Id. 
84. This would be similar to the members of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, who represent the O.A.S. rather than their national governments. See Note, 
supra note 6, at 301. This proposal contemplates that seasoned troops already serving their 
national military services would be employed to make up the force. Such troops could be 
detached on a leave of absence type basis from their native service while they were serving 
with the O.A.S .. Of course, they would retain their rank and pay status, as well as receive 
promotion opportunities and credit for time in service as if they were still in their respective 
national services. This force should be set up as an elite unit, appointment to which would 
be on a competitive basis. Therefore, appointment to this force would be an honor; and 
service with it an important asset on a military service resume. Such a system would provide 
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The effectiveness of such a regional force when deployed for 
peace keeping or other purposes has recently been demonstrated in 
Chad, Africa.8 & Similarly, the O.A.S. demonstrated its ability to 
field an effective multinational force with its successful peace-
keeping mission in the Dominican Republic in 1965. 86 In keeping · 
with the underlying policies of the Inter-American system, how-
ever, the proposed force should not be used in an interventionery 
manner.87 The force should only be deployed when its assistance is 
requested by a legitimate government,88 or to investigate charges of 
much incentive for appointment and thus theoretically, should attract the best of the re-
spective national military organizations for the O.A.S. to screen. 
Alternatively, raw recruits could be inducted from the member states and trained en-
tirely by the 0.A.S. for its specific purposes. This might avoid the danger of ingrained loyal-
ties to any particular national organizations as a sense of "esprit de corps" could be instilled 
during training. 
85. In Chad, a multi-national peacekeeping force was deployed with great effectiveness. 
The force was organized under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, which 
similarly to the O.A.S., is a regional security organization within the framework of the 
United Nations. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1982, at A3, col. 4. 
Article 52 of the U.N. Charter authorizes regional organizations to deal "with such mat-
ters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for 
regional action." U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1. 
86. During the civil strife which occurred in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the 
O.A.S. deployed a force of approximately 13,000 troops to restore the peace, and ultimately, 
to supervise the holding of free elections. Even though the mission was hailed as a success, it 
unfortunately did not take place until after an initial, unilateral response on the part of the 
United States. 
The mission did however set the precedent for actual deployment of troops under the 
command of the O.A.S. See generally Note, supra note 6. 
The O.A.S. action was taken pursuant to the Rio Treaty, and is authorized under Arti-
cles 7 and 8 of that treaty. See Rio Treaty, supra note 54, arts. 7, 8. 
87. See supra notes 41, 43. 
88. The invitation of a lawful government has been recognized as legal justification 
under international law for a foreign nation to provide assistance, or to intervene in the 
inviting nation. See generally Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States relative 
to International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L., 200, 203 (1984). However, the concept of a legiti-
mate government is at best rather amorphous, and thus subject to manipulation. The rights 
of revolution and self-determination are recognized in international law, and are inimical to 
the American tradition. See generally Note, supra note 68, at 143-52. Therefore, "invita-
tion" should not be relied upon as a legitimate justification for intervention on behalf of a 
"legal," but repressive regime. 
Noted scholar, Farooq Hasson, has warned about allowing any permissive doctrines jus-
tifying intervention, except those explicitly provided for in the United Nations Charter or in 
a multilateral treaty of similar import. Hassan's reasoning is that interventions are invaria-
bly by the strong against the weak - an argument that must be taken seriously. 
"To deny oppressed peoples the right to rebel openly against their governments by in-
tervening on behalf of these governments is to deny them any right to participation and any 
hope for dignity." Id. at 429. 
For the foregoing reasons, before the proposed force is deployed to intervene in a situa-
tion of internal civil strife at the request of the ruling regime, the O.A.S. must carefully 
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intervention by extra-national forces. 89 
Additionally, this force could be deployed for such legitimate 
purposes as the supervision of free elections90 or to investigate 
charges of violations of human rights. 91 
A major advantage of such a standing force is that it could be 
rapidly deployed when necessary, rather than being hastily thrown 
together on an "ad hoc" basis. Further, such a standing force could 
develop its own procedures and institutional structures. This 
would allow its component troops to operate in a more cohesive, 
homogenous manner, thus lessening the problems caused by na-
tionalistic allegiances. 92 
In addition to the leverage which this force would provide the 
O.A.S. in dealing with regional problems, the close collaboration of 
national military forces, which would be necessary for the estab-
lishment of such a force, should greatly enhance the practice of 
inter-american cooperation. 93 
Apart from military uses, there are collateral benefits which 
could be realized by the creation of such a force. For example, this 
force could be quickly deployed to assist in the event of natural 
disasters, which have unfortunately been quite common in Latin 
consider whether its intervention would be promotive of the principles espoused by the In-
ter-American System, or whether its actions would merely serve to perpetuate the status 
quo. 
89. For example, in the present situation where there are charges of weapons flowing 
across the border from Nicaragua into El Salvador, see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying 
text, the O.A.S. forces could be deployed on the Salvadoran side of the border at the request 
of the Salvadoran Government. From this position, these forces could investigate the 
charges, and if necessary, take action to interdict the flow of weapons and troops from an 
extra-national source. In this way, the extra-national intervention could be halted without 
the necessity of intervening on the sovereign territory of the offending state. It should be 
noted that one of the main justifications relied on by the United States in support of its 
involvement in this specific situation is the interdiction of arms. See Lobel & Ratner, supra 
note 66, at 40. Therefore, the deployment of the proposed O.A.S. force in the manner envi-
sioned above should put to rest this particular perceived need for U.S. action. Of course, 
inversely, the Nicaraguan government could request the aid of the O.A.S. force in the same 
manner. 
90. Representative democracy is one of the founding principles of the Inter-American 
system. See O.A.S. Charter, arts. 1-6, reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 1, at 548-49. 
Therefore, deployment of the proposed O.A.S. force to insure the holding of free elections 
would seem to be a legitimate O.A.S. action. This was one of the functions of the temporary 
O.A.S. force deployed in the Dominican Republic in 1965. See supra note 87. 
91. For an excellent and extensive discussion of a proposal for a standing O.A.S. force 
designed specifically to enforce human rights, see Note, supra note 6. As noted previously, 
however, the model proposed there is far more interventionery in nature than the force here 
envisioned. See supra note 79. 
92. See supra note 85. 
93. See generally Note, supra note 6, at 340. 
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America. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Inter-American system has as its cornerstones the doc-
trines of non-intervention and self-determination. In addition, the 
O.A.S. is bound by its charter to the principles of representative 
democracy, and the doctrines espoused in international law. 
However, laws enacted without an appropriate enforcement 
mechanism are generally ineffective, and tend to erode the credi-
bility of the entire legal system. This is true on any level, be it 
local, national or international. This is reflected by the present sit-
uation in Central America, with national actors taking action in 
disregard both of treaties to which they are party, as well as the 
general tenets of international law. 
Historically speaking, the United States has tended to act uni-
laterally in the Latin American Region. This has been due to per-
ceived threats to national security interests, as well as to feelings 
that Latin America was properly within the U.S. sphere of influ-
ence. Such a policy of unilateral action runs counter to the princi-
ples of the Inter-American system. However, in the absence of any 
legitimate force to settle regional disputes and promote the ideo-
logical concepts espoused by both the United States and the 
O.A.S., it is likely that the United States will continue to take uni-
lateral action, thus violating its own committments to the doc-
trines of non-intervention and self-determination. 
A likely solution to this problem would be the establishment 
of a standing multinational police force, made up of troops from 
member nations of the O.A.S .. Such a force could be used to en-
force the principles of non-intervention, self-determination, and 
representative democracy. As the promotion of these principles 
should be ideologically compatible with the stated policies of the 
United States, the existence of such a force should preclude any 
perceived need for the United States to act unilaterally. Further, 
the implementation of such a force under the O.A.S., where all of 
the member states are considered equal, would be promotive of 
solidarity, equality and cooperation between the nations of the 
Western Hemisphere, thus advancing the very reasons for the exis-
tence of the Inter-American system. 
David A. Rikard 
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